また、インド洋での「無料のガソリンスタンド」の効果の問題点を指摘した記事もありましたので、転載します。
記事の内容は一部抜粋ですので、全文はリンクをクリックしてお確かめください。
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海上自衛隊 インド洋派兵５年９カ月
テロ根絶と無縁
2007年8月26日(日)「しんぶん赤旗」
海上自衛隊は2001年12月以来、同法に基づいてのべ61隻の艦船とのべ約1万1千人の人員を派兵、“テロ勢力の海上移動阻止”を掲げた「海上阻止行動」（ＭＳＯ）に参加する米軍など5カ国の艦船に燃料や水、ヘリ燃料を提供しています。
中東を作戦区域とする米中央軍によると、海自はＭＳＯ全体の艦船用燃料の４０％を提供しています。しかし、給油量はイラク戦争後の2003年5月を境に急減し、現在は月あたり2千～3千キロリットルの水準で推移しています（グラフ）。
しかも、海自がインド洋への派兵を続けた六年間を見ると、テロはむしろ拡大しているのが実態です。アフガニスタンでは米軍の「対テロ」戦争に参加する兵士の死者が増え続け（グラフ）、自爆テロや外国人の誘拐も頻発しています。
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イラク部隊半減提案か
米統合参謀本部議長が意向
2007年8月26日(日)「しんぶん赤旗」
【ワシントン＝山崎伸治】
24日付の米紙ロサンゼルス・タイムズは、米統合参謀本部のペース議長がブッシュ大統領に対し、イラク駐留米軍を半減するよう進言する意向だと報じました。
米政権および軍高官の言明として伝えたもの。
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イラク駐留米兵からの手紙
“占領 展望なし”
2007年8月26日(日)「しんぶん赤旗」
「ワシントンでの政治議論は、実に非現実的だ」。イラクに駐留する米軍の現役兵士がニューヨーク・タイムズ紙（19日付）に連名で寄稿し、イラク情勢の「改善」を理由に軍事占領支配の正当化をはかろうとするブッシュ政権や議会の動きを批判しました。
（ワシントン＝鎌塚由美）
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投稿したのは、歩兵部隊として掃討作戦の最前線にいる米陸軍の第82空挺（くうてい）師団の兵士七人です。兵士たちは、15カ月にわたる駐留でイラク情勢を実際に目にし、
「紛争は徐々に制御できるようになっているという最近のメディアの報道に疑問を持っている」
「欠点があり、米国中心の枠組みからの見積もりだ」
「毎日目にしている人々の間の、政治的社会的な不安の高まりが無視されていると感じている」
と述べています。
また、
「駐留米軍がイラク人を専制君主の支配から解放したかもしれないが、イラクの人々の自尊心も奪ったことをわれわれは認めなくてはならない」
と訴えています。
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New York Times (Free Preview) August 19, 2007, Sunday
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY AND JEREMY A. MURPHY (NYT); Editorial Desk
Baghdad VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago ...
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問題はイラク首相ではない
“米政策の大失敗”
ＮＹタイムズが批判
2007年8月26日(日)「しんぶん赤旗」
【ワシントン＝鎌塚由美】
九月半ばに予定されるイラク戦況報告を前に、米政界に広がるマリキ・イラク首相批判について、ニューヨーク・タイムズ（24日付）は、「問題はマリキ氏ではない」と題する社説を掲載しました。
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同紙社説は、「米国の政策が大きな失敗をしているのに、ブッシュ大統領ではなく、マリキ首相を非難することは、皮肉な政略そのものだ」と厳しく指摘し、イラクでの戦況改善が見られないのはマリキ政権が悪いとする主張の盛り上がりをたしなめました。
また、米ＣＮＮテレビは23日、マリキ首相更迭キャンペーンの裏に、アラウィ・イラク前首相の米政界への働きかけがあると伝えました。
アラウィ氏は、暫定政府の初代首相で、フセイン政権下の亡命イラク人。米中央情報局（ＣＩＡ）とのつながりが指摘されてきた人物です。
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ＮＹタイムズ記事は、ここをクリック （英語）
本文末尾に英語版全文を表示。【続き】をご覧下さい。
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お読み頂き ありがとうございました。
日本の未来のために！クリックを！
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しんぶん「赤旗」などのお申し込みや入党の相談や
このブログへのメールは下記へどうぞ。
jcpmetal@yahoogroups.jp
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Editorial
The Problem Isn't Mr. Maliki
Published: August 24, 2007
Blaming the prime minister of Iraq, rather than the president of the United States, for the spectacular failure of American policy, is cynical politics, pure and simple. It is neither fair nor helpful in figuring out how to end America's biggest foreign policy fiasco since Vietnam.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has been catastrophic for Iraq ever since he took over from the equally disastrous Ibrahim al-Jaafari more than a year ago. America helped engineer Mr. Jaafari's removal, only to get Mr. Maliki. That tells you something important about whether this is more than a matter of personalities. Mr. Jaafari, as it happens, was Iraq's first democratically chosen leader under the American-sponsored constitution.
Continuing in the Jaafari tradition, Mr. Maliki's government has fashioned Iraqi security forces into an instrument of Shiite domination and revenge, trying to steer American troops away from Shiite militia strongholds and leaving Sunni Arab civilians unprotected from sectarian terrorism. His government's deep sectarian urges have also been evident in the continuing failure to enact legislation to fairly share oil revenues and the persistence of rules that bar much of the Sunni middle class from professional employment.
Sectarian fracturing even extends to the electricity grid, where armed groups have seized control of key switching stations and refused to share power with Baghdad and other provinces.
The problem is not Mr. Maliki's narrow-mindedness or incompetence. He is the logical product of the system the United States created, one that deliberately empowered the long-persecuted Shiite majority and deliberately marginalized the long-dominant Sunni Arab minority. It was all but sure to produce someone very like Mr. Maliki, a sectarian Shiite far more interested in settling scores than in reconciling all Iraqis to share power in a unified and peaceful democracy.
That distinction is enormously significant, since President Bush's current troop buildup is supposed to buy, at the cost of American lives, a period of relative calm for Iraqi politicians to bring about national reconciliation. How much calm it has brought is the subject of debate. But just about everyone in Washington now agrees that Mr. Maliki has made little effort to advance national unity.
The most recent intelligence report on Iraq, released yesterday, concludes that Mr. Maliki's government is unable to govern and will become more precarious・over the next six months to a year.
That is why there can be no serious argument for buying still more time at the cost of still more American lives and an even greater cost for Iraqis. A report by an Iraqi correspondent for The Times earlier this week described the deadly sectarian hatreds that have torn apart life in his home province, Diyala, which is almost equally divided between Sunnis and Shiites.
The same day, an Op-Ed article by seven American soldiers serving in Iraq underscored the extent to which American troops have worn out their welcome among Iraqis as social and economic conditions have deteriorated and rampant lawlessness has destroyed the most basic sense of personal security.
When it comes to fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq, Washington and Baghdad are often at cross-purposes. In the western province of Al Anbar, the American military has registered some gains by enlisting local Iraqi Sunnis to fight against foreign-led Al Qaeda formations. That strategy depends on the sense of Iraqi nationhood among local Sunnis. But the Maliki government prefers to concentrate on fortifying Shiite political power and exploiting the immense oil reserves of southeast Iraq. It is hard to imagine any Shiite government acting very differently.
Washington's failure to face these unpleasant realities opens the door to strange and dangerous fantasies, like Mr. Bush's surreal take on the Vietnam war.
The real lesson of Vietnam for Iraq is clear enough. America lost that war because a succession of changes in South Vietnamese leadership, many of them inspired by Washington, never produced an effective government in Saigon. None of those changes, beginning with the American-sponsored coup that led to the murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, changed the underlying reality of a South Vietnamese government and army that never won the loyalty and support of large sections of the Vietnamese population.
The short-term sequels of American withdrawal from Indochina were brutal, as the immediate sequels of America's withdrawal from Iraq will surely be. But the American people rightly concluded that with no way to win a military victory, there could be no justification for allowing thousands more United States troops to die in Vietnam. Those deaths would not have changed the sequels to the war, just as more American deaths will not change the sequel to the war in Iraq. Once the war in Southeast Asia was over, America's domestic divisions healed, its battered armed forces were rebuilt and the nation was much better positioned to deal with the relentless challenges of global leadership.
If Mr. Bush, whose decision to inject Vietnam into the debate over Iraq was bizarre, took the time to study the real lessons of Vietnam, he would not be so eager to lead America still deeper into the 21st century quagmire he has created in Iraq. Following his path will not rectify the mistakes of Vietnam, it will simply repeat them.
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